

**Prosecution of War Crimes:
An Internship at the ICTY: Part 2
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia)**

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Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadzic

Timeline

Indicted	July 24, 1995 / October 19, 2009
Arrested	July 21, 2008
Transferred to ICTY	July 30, 2008
Trial commenced	October 26, 2009
Prosecution case closed	May 25, 2012
Karadzic motion for acquittal	June 11, 2012
98bis decision - Trial Chamber	June 28, 2012
98bis decision - Appeals Chamber	July 11, 2013
Defense case commenced	October 16, 2012
Prosecution motion to reopen	March 4, 2014
Decision denying motion to reopen	March 20, 2014
Defense case closed	May 1, 2014
Briefs filed	August 29, 2014
Oral argument submitted	September 29 - October 7, 2014
Judgement expected	first quarter of 2016

Statistics

Trial days	497
Witnesses	336 for Prosecution 243 for Defense 1 for Trial Chamber
Exhibits	11,500 (146,000 pp)
Transcript pages	48,000
Prosecutions's final brief	413 pages (word limit: 300,000)
Appendices A-J	383 pages

Indictment

- Two counts of genocide (Counts 1 and 2) (municipalities and Srebrenica)
- Five counts of crimes against humanity
 - persecutions (Count 3)
 - extermination (Count 4)
 - murder (Count 5)
 - deportation (Count 7)
 - inhumane acts (forcible transfer) (Count 8)
- Four counts of violations of the laws or customs of war
 - murder (Count 6)
 - terror (Count 9)
 - unlawful attacks on civilians (Count 10)
 - taking of hostages (Count 11)

The indictment alleges that Karadzic is individually criminally responsible under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute for these counts through his participation in a number of Joint Criminal Enterprises (JCEs):

- JCE to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from territories claimed by Bosnian Serbs ("Municipalities" component)
- JCE to establish and carry out campaign of sniping and shelling against the civilian population in Sarajevo, aimed to spread terror ("Sarajevo" component)
- JCE to eliminate Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing men and boys, and forcibly removing women, young children and the elderly
- JCE to take UN personnel hostage in order to compel NATO to end air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets

UPDATED STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
(excerpts')

Having been established by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter referred to as "the International Tribunal") shall function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.

Article 1
Competence of the International Tribunal

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.

Article 2
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:

- (a) wilful killing;
- (b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
- (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
- (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
- (e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power;
- (f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial;
- (g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
- (h) taking civilians as hostages.

¹ Excerpted from ICTY.org, which note this is "not an official document..."

Article 3
Violations of the laws or customs of war

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:

- (a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
- (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
- (c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
- (d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science;
- (e) plunder of public or private property.

Article 4
Genocide

1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) killing members of the group;
- (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

3. The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) genocide;
- (b) conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) complicity in genocide.

Article 5
Crimes against humanity

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:

- (a) murder;
- (b) extermination;
- (c) enslavement;
- (d) deportation;
- (e) imprisonment;
- (f) torture;
- (g) rape;
- (h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
- (i) other inhumane acts.

Article 6
Personal jurisdiction

The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present Statute.

Article 7
Individual criminal responsibility

1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

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RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (excerpts)

Section 3: Rules of Evidence

Rule 89

General Provisions

- (A) A Chamber shall apply the rules of evidence set forth in this Section, and shall not be bound by national rules of evidence. (Amended 1 Dec 2000, amended 13 Dec 2000)
- (B) In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.
- (C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.
- (D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.
- (E) A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of court.
- (F) A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of justice allow, in written form.

Section 4: Judgement

Rule 98 bis Judgement of Acquittal

At the close of the Prosecutor's case, the Trial Chamber shall, by oral decision and after hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a judgement of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction.

PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION OF PROSECUTION FINAL TRIAL BRIEF

5. KARAD, I permitted the campaign to continue and failed to prevent or punish perpetrators

643. Despite his awareness of the illegality of the sniping and shelling campaign and his demonstrated ability to halt it when he wished, KARADfrille allowed the campaign of tenor to continue for 44 months. He took no meaningful steps to prevent, investigate or punish SRK unlawful attacks on civilians in Sarajevo. Instead, he promoted or awarded those responsible for the campaign. He thereby created and sustained a culture of impunity.

(a) Awareness of the Campaign of Terror

644. The evidence is overwhelming that KARADIE knew about the nature and extent of the sniping and shelling campaign and its effects on the populace in Sarajevo. As a preliminary matter, his denials, deflections, and in particular occasional frank acknowledgments of protests, discussed above,²³⁹² demonstrate such awareness.

^{645.} KARADbe received written and face-to-face protests from international observers, and was exposed to media reports in an environment saturated²³⁹³ with news about the effect of the terror campaign on Sarajevo civilians. KARADZIC followed this media coverage closely.²³⁹⁴

646. Throughout the sniping and shelling campaign, *UN* and international political and military officials repeatedly and strongly protested to KARADilfe about attacks on Sarajevo's civilians. For example:

³² See IV.C.3: KARANJe denied and deflected international criticism.

⁹⁹ KDZ450:P5906,paras.13 I-132;

A.VANLYNDEN:P926,para.11; A.BANBURY:P2451,para.201; M.BELL:P1996,paras.3,70;

M.BELL:T.9755,9795-9796; J.BOWEN:P2068,para.70; J.BOWEN:T.10082-10083,10110-

10116,10140-10141; A.VANLYNDEN:P926, aras.6-13,27,30,44,53,69-73,75-77;

ANANLYNDEN:T.2417-2420; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

A .VANLYNDEN:P926,paras.12-13,69-73,76-77; A.VANLYNDEN:T.2417-2418; KULL:T.9795-9796.

- UN representatives met on 30 May 1992 with Slobodan MILOSEVIC and KARADZIC in an appeal to stop what even MILOSEVIC described as the "bloody, criminal" bombardment of the civilian population of Sarajevo.²³⁹⁵
- At a December 1992 meeting with KARADZIC and MLADIC, OWEN denounced the shelling of Sarajevo as a "disgrace", saying that on the previous day he had even seen artillery shells in the recovery room of a Sarajevo hospital.²³⁹⁶ One month later MORILLON protested to KARADZIC about a direct artillery hit on the Koševo hospital that injured patients and staff, noting that there can be no excuse for shelling a hospital.²³⁹⁷

- After women and children were killed in G4, MORILLON immediately sent a protest letter to KARADZIC on 2 June 1993.²⁴⁰¹
- AKASHI met with KARADZIC to discuss shelling, sniping and other issues.²⁴⁰²
- ROSE raised the issue of sniping and shelling of civilians with the BSI. at every meeting from January 1994 onwards.²⁴⁰³ He also protested to

P1035,para.3; P1036.

²³⁹⁵ P.TUCKER:P4203,paras.95-99; P2034; P1273; M.BELL:P1996,para.82,
²³⁹⁷ P1275. *See also* P6336.

³⁹⁹ _____
²³⁹⁹ _____
⁷⁰³ _____ *See also* _____

⁷⁴¹ P5059. *See also* P1068.

¹⁰² D3491,pp.1,3,paras.3,8; P1676; P2479,p.3,para.6; P2255,p.7,para.6;
A.BANBURY: P2451,paras.96-98.

⁷⁰³ M.ROSE:P1638,paras.26,30,107,151,200-201.

KARADik about shelling, sniping and harassment of convoys,²⁴⁰⁴ including specific protests about 67²⁴¹ and FI 1.²⁴⁰⁶

- As BANBURY explained, the problem of sniping at civilians in Sarajevo was so prevalent that the UN constantly raised the issue with KARALIYik, his military and other officials.²⁴⁰⁷

647. These are just a sampling of the many protests made to KARADZIC regarding the sniping and shelling of civilians in Sarajevo.²⁴⁰⁸

648, **KARAWhe's** subordinates, MLADI,²⁴⁰⁹ GALIC,²⁴¹⁰ MIL6SEVIC,²⁴¹¹ and INDIC²⁴¹² also received protests against the shelling and sniping of civilians as well as other parts of the campaign of terror.

649. **KARADhe** (and other members of the BSL) were also "absolutely" aware of UNSC resolutions condemning the shelling and sniping of civilians in Sarajevo,²⁴¹³ yet ignored them. **ICARADkIe** confirmed his contempt for—and awareness of—

²⁴⁰³ P1656; M.ROSE:P1638,paras.35,63,146; M.ROSE:T.7269-7271; P868.

²⁴⁰⁵ M.ROSE:P1638,para.35.

¹⁴⁶ PI 644,p.2.

A.RANBURY:T.13469.

²¹⁰⁸ J.WILSON:P1029,paras.49,122; ; P4216,pp.1-2; RTUCKER:P4203,para.15; P4226; P845; P830,p.5; D.HARLAND:P820,paras.60-64,122-123; D.HARLAND:T.2037-2038; P1672,para.5; P3862,para.3; P2260,para.3; R.SMITH:T.11655-1 1657; P2264,paras.3,6; H.ABDEL-RAZEK:P1258,pp.17,21-22,24.

¹⁴⁹⁰ P1043; P1044; P1478.p.34 J.WILSON:P1029,paras.55,77-78,126-127; J.WILSON:T.3924-3926; P1271; H.ABDEL-RAZEK:P1258,p.22; P1672p.2; P867; M.ROSE:T.7268-7271; P1644,p.2; M.ROSE:P1638,paras.56,155-156; D.HARLAND:P820,paras.143-145; D.HARLAND:T.2037-2038; P876,para.3; PI 470,para.3; P2455,para.9; P2274; R.SMITE:T.11309-11311,11420-11421; AF2877; P2107; P.TUCKER:P4203 ras.25-20 P2125; :P5906,para.54;

D.FRASER:T.8018,8024-8025,8049-8050; D.FRASER:P1762,pp.21-23,43-46; H.ABDEL-RAZEK:P1258,pp.13,15,16-17,18,24,26,27; H. ABDEL-RAZEK:T.5553-5556; P1054; P1059; R.MOLE:P1426. aras 97-100. AF38-AF41; S.CiAl 1-0.T 37 - 3-37646, P1065,. .2,4; P1061; P I 060; .P1785,p.1;

),..VANBAAL:P1818,para.39, P1059; P1060; P6298.

⁴¹¹ D.FRASER:T.8018; D.FRASER:P1762,pp.8-9; AF2876-AF2877; P2134; .P1785,p.1;

T.10490,10496; .P1785,p.1;

P895; P2107,p.3; D.HARLAND:P820,paras.210-212. See also AF2873.

²¹⁹³ M.INDIC:D2774,paras.84-85; F.THOMAS:P1558,paras.53-54,57-58.

⁴¹³ p.ruCKER:P4203,para.288; P981; P982; P984; D.HARLAND:P820,para.185; AF9; AF 10; AF I 2; D1509; D162.p126.

such condemnations when, on 29 May 1995, the Supreme Command declared all UNSC resolutions null and void.²⁴¹⁴

(b) Failure to investigate or punish

650. If KARADZIC had wanted to order investigations of SRK crimes occurring in Sarajevo, he could have done so effectively. On occasions where he genuinely sought information about SRK conduct, KARADZIC issued such orders and they were acted upon.²⁴¹⁵ Defence witnesses acknowledged that from the earliest days of the conflict the SRK could investigate the criminal conduct of its soldiers for incidents such as theft, assault, and attempted murder,²⁴¹⁶ and even conducted investigations of crimes against humanity committed against Serbs.²⁴¹⁷ SRK Command documents confirm its use of the power to investigate and punish its soldiers,²⁴¹⁸ and MILOŠEVIĆ acknowledged his power to submit criminal reports.²⁴¹⁹

651. Unsurprisingly, this power was not exercised. KARADZIC would not logically have punished his subordinates for implementing his policies and did not do so. Instead, his deflections and denials of unlawful shelling and sniping²⁴²⁰ reflected a climate of impunity for such conduct within the SRK. KARADZIC attempted during the war to maintain the falsehood that no investigations or punishment were required and the stream of witnesses who testified for him attempted to perpetuate the same falsehood,²⁴²¹ contrary to the vast weight of the evidence. Denying the occurrence of unlawful shelling and sniping within their range of knowledge,²⁴²² they necessarily implied an absence of any reporting or investigations regarding such crimes, a fact

⁴¹⁴ P887,

⁴¹⁵ For example, in March 1995, incensed by a report written by Colonel DRAGI(EVK7(P2691), KARADZIC issued an order to the SRK Command demanding information about this (P2679), and this order was immediately acted upon(P2681); P2680. Likewise, in May 1995, KARADZIC issued an order to the SRK through the VRS-GS to establish an investigation into an incident "which happened in the Independent Praha Battalion on 10 May 1995". P2682.

⁴¹⁷ See, e.g., IGIC:T.30785-30787,30803-30801.

⁴¹⁷ P2646.

⁴¹³ P2695; P2708; P2706.

⁴¹⁹ D.MILOŠEVIĆ V10.,T.32859; AF2881-AF2882.

⁷⁴⁷ See IV.C.3: ICARAIYik, denied and deflected international criticism.

²⁴²¹ See, e.g., S.VELJOVIĆ:D2351,para.15; M.DZIDA:D2375,para.19; M.GARK::D2379,para.25; S.D7.INO:D2387,para.38; B.TOMIC:D2418,paras.17-18; V.DUNW:D2451,para.10; R.MAKSIMOVIĆ:D2667,para.10.

⁷⁴² See, e.g., S.VELJOVIĆ:D2351,para.15; M.D2.1DA:D2375,para.19; M.GAR1:132379,para.25; S.D.INO:D2387,parii.38; B.TOMI(:D2418,paras.17-18; V.DUNJIG:D2451,para.10; R.MAKSIIIVIOVIĆ:D2667,para.10.

PUBLIC REDACTED VERSION OF APPENDIX F: DEFENSE WITNESS CREDIBILITY CHARTS

I	
Claim contradicted by own statement	
<i>Cairn'</i>	<i>Contradiction</i>
Claimed he did not remember a single protest that was lodged "just because of a sniping incident"(T.37397,37792); and that UN observers never alerted him to the fact that "the artillery forces of the SRK were acting in a way that would not have been legitimate;" and that he didn't "receive ever information to that effect":T.37210.	Reminded of this evidence, GALIC initially claimed documents contained no reference to artillery fire, only mortar shelling(T.37648), then immediately admitted receiving protests about shelling, and general protests about sniping in a particular area(T.37649), and learning that SRK shelling and sniping into Bosnian-held Sarajevo was causing civilian casualties through sources including his staff(T.37788); UNPROFOR and the UNMOs(T.37647,37788-37789); the media(T.37397) and the Main Staff(T.37397). Later backtracked, saying while he didn't specifically recall notice from Main Staff, he accepted it was possible if transmitted via INDIC and his people that it had been conveyed to him:T.37794. Accepted that cross-examination documents established he had notice of casualties:T.37791.
Stated that whenever the SRK received protests, they took the allegations very seriously, treated them responsibly, and he ensured that all the allegations from UNPROFOR were checked:T.37210-37211,37224,37644.	Testified that he could not respond to general protests and investigate alleged incidents unless they were hacked up by commission reports with specific supporting documentation in the format defined in Protocol I:T.37649-37650,37658-37660,37796-37797. Asked to identify what part of Protocol I he referred UNPROFOR to in order for them to adopt the required format, admitted that "protest" appears neither in the Geneva Conventions nor in Protocol I, then changed his evidence, claiming he pointed them to Art.90 regarding commissions in charge of establishing grave violations of the conventions:T.37796-37801.
Claim contradicted by other reliable evidence	
<i>Clitim'</i>	<i>Contradiction</i>
UN equipment, command posts and positions were never targeted by the SRK:T.37815.	Confronted with two letters from SMO CUTLER to GALIC personally, dated 13 and 14-Feb-1993, protesting the repeated, deliberate SRK shelling of OP Papa 5(P6298;P6299), GALIC offered inconsistent responses, initially stating he was unaware of this OP's location, then implicitly admitting the shelling. Regarding P6299, initially said he didn't recall the situation in the area, but then testified that there was combat ongoing at the time. Confronted with CUTLER's testimony in <i>Galic</i> ° trial that he had investigated and found no evidence of outgoing fire nearby, GALIC said he simply didn't remember this

IT-95-5/18-T
Confidential

	specific day, then claimed to remember many details, saying the OP was not visible enough, too close to Muslim positions, and may have changed position:T.37814-37822. Unable to say why no one answered CUTLER's protests, GALL then undermined all his previous answers saying that he wasn't there and didn't really know what happened:T.37825.
Re:F6 and D3452, stated that during Orthodox and Muslim holidays there was as little war activity as possible:T.37521.	Confronted with UNMO report showing SRK forces heavily shelled northern and western areas of Sarajevo and city centre for the entire week of 31-Dec-1993 to 6-Jan-1994 (date of F6)(P2293), GALIC stated that the shelling described in this report took place outside of Dobrinja (where F6 occurred):T.37827-37831.
In the SRK there were no sniper units:T.37191-37192,37465,37472.	Confronted with the assertion that the SRK 1 st SmbR had a sniper unit, quipped: "Not correct. If you know better what the situation was in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, then fine, you can testify. I'll do something else":T.37838. Then responding to Defence witness MALETIC's testimony(D2519,para.31) that there was a sniper squad in the 2 nd Battalion of the 1 st SmbR, he replied: "I did not understand these statements and assertions. To arrive at conclusions based on partial information, if anybody had such units, they should tell us when they were set up, who set them up, under whose command they were." Asked by the Chamber whether he excluded the possibility that a sniper squad existed, GALL then said he didn't know, but it was possible:T.37838-37842.
From the reports he read in respect of G8 after returning to corps command, GALIC learned that some commission was established to inspect the units:T.37863.	Testified he didn't know who was on the commission, who led it, who commanded it, what they worked on, what they did, and where that report is:T.37867.
KARADhe would never have punished the Serbs by robbing them of electricity and water:T.37877.	Confronted with 27-Sep-1994 complaint of the Assembly of Serb Sarajevo to KARADZIE and KRAJISNIK about the cutting off of supplies to Sarajevo to raise tension(P6300), replied that he had no such information, and that if this is the way to manipulate the situation, then this was bad, because civilians on both sides suffered the most. Concluded with the implausible assertion that OTP was the first one saying that utilities were manipulated:T.37877-37879.
SRK complied with the total exclusion zone agreement to the last letter, and if they ever did anything fully and completely, "then it was the implementation of your agreement with AKASHI that was reached on the 18 th of February, 1994. That's the so called TEZ agreement":T.37447-37448,37458-	Confronted with his 9-Feb-1994 order to all units to move defective weapons to visible locations towards Sarajevo, so that if the agreement was signed the defective weapons could be removed and basic weapons systems would meanwhile remain at vital positions(P6303), claimed he was not at Corps Command at that time, and this was a preparatory order for what would follow

IT-95-5/18-T
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37459.	on the 18 th or 19 th :T.37952-37955. Shown his 20-Feb-1994 personal report to the Main Staff, confirming SRK had actually not complied, and "parts of units with their private weapons were kept in full combat readiness with enhanced measures of surveillance and position maintenance"(D2802). GALL maintained that weapons remaining in the TEZ were not in working order, and this order only referred to light weapons from 12.7mm downwards:T.37956-37959.
Other credibility/reliability issue	
Frequently completely unresponsive: <i>e.g.</i> on the questions of the basis for his conviction(T.37638-37639); whether he ever took action in response to Maj. BERGERON's sniping protests(T.37655-37657); who in UNPROFOR he told about the prescribed format he required in order to action a protest(T.37797-37798); why he never told CUTLER that he needed a commission report, an on-site investigation, the azimuth or the direction of fire(T.37823-37924); whether a cease-fire was in force in May 1994(T.37834-37835); whether there was firing coming from next to the atomic shelter on the date of G3(T.37854-37855); whether he would fire a mortar at a target 150m away(T.37856-37862); whether SRK forces shelled Sarajevo on 4-Feb-1993(D3410;T.37925-37928); and whether he was familiar with the Old Town of Sarajevo:T.37929.	
Several times GALL stressed that the source of his evidence was not his direct knowledge of the events but evidence elicited during his own trial or general knowledge unrelated to the specific time he was asked about: <i>e.g.</i> T.37478-37480,37495,37564,37833,37837,37854-37855,37863,37924,37936,38038.	

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Claim contradicted by other reliable evidence	
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The Bosnian Human Rights Chamber quashed the entire judgement that resulted in GARAPLIJA's conviction:T.33404.	Confronted with the fact that the Bosnian Human Rights Chamber ultimately upheld his conviction for mistreatment and attempted murder, he claimed that he was only ultimately convicted for "overstepping [...] official authorities" but not attempted murder:T.33405. When confronted with the Bosnian Human Rights Chamber Judgement upholding the Bosnian Supreme Court conviction of GARAPLIJA for maltreatment in discharge of duty and attempted murder(P6103) and asked to confirm that these were the charges upon which he was ultimately convicted, the witness provided evasive and non-responsive answers:T.33405-33408.
Other credibility/reliability issue	
Was convicted for the mistreatment and attempted murder of HERENDA perpetrated in the course of the very same intetTogat on in which he gathered all the information, with respect to the activities of the Seve unit, that he testified about:T.33403-33409.	

IT-95-5/18-T
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